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MCCUTCHEON v. FEC: SACRIFICING CAMPAIGN FINANCE
REGULATION IN THE NAME OF FREE SPEECH
HALEY S. PETERSON ∗
The 2008 elections marked the first time that campaign spending by
presidential candidates exceeded $1 billion, more than double the amount
spent in 2004. 1 Private contributions, in particular to the Obama campaign,
were credited as one of the major reasons for this enormous spending increase. 2 Four years later, during the 2012 election, candidates spent $3.2
billion, doubling spending again according to Federal Election Commission
(“FEC”) estimates. 3 Individuals alone contributed over $540 million to the
Obama campaign and over $300 million to the Romney campaign. 4
The Federal Elections Campaign Act (“FECA”) sought to limit these
types of campaign contributions by individuals, among other campaign finance regulations. In McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission, 5 the
Supreme Court considered whether aggregate limits on campaign contributions violated individuals’ First Amendment rights of free speech. 6 The
Court determined that by setting a ceiling on campaign contributions, the
aggregate limits essentially forced individuals to ration their political participation in violation of the First Amendment. 7 The Court reasoned that the
government only could justify limits on free speech in the interest of preventing quid pro quo corruption—that is, money given to public officials in
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2. Cummings, supra note 1.
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http://www.fec.gov/disclosurep/pnational.do.
5. McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014) (plurality opinion).
6. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
7. McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1448.
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direct exchange for political favors. 8 The Court struck down the aggregate
limits, concluding that they were not sufficiently related to the government’s interest in preventing this type of corruption.9
The Court should have upheld these limits. First, the Court incorrectly
analyzed the government’s interest, breaking with precedent by narrowing
the definition of corruption. 10 Second, there is a significant risk that individuals will work around other FECA regulations without the aggregate
limits in place. 11 Finally, the Court’s decision leaves open the question of
FECA’s effectiveness without aggregate limits, threatening to dismantle
campaign finance regulation altogether.
I. THE CASE
In September 2012, plaintiffs Shaun McCutcheon and the Republican
National Committee (“RNC”) challenged FECA in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. 12 Specifically, the parties challenged the constitutionality of the statute’s aggregate limits on campaign
contributions under the First Amendment. 13 FECA contains two limitations
on political campaign contributions: base limits, which restrict how much a
contributor can give “to specified categories of recipients,” and aggregate
limits, which set a ceiling on the overall amount an individual can donate
over a given two-year election period.14 Base limits apply to contributions
made by a variety of entities, including “individuals, partnerships, committees, associations, corporations, unions, and other organizations,” whereas
aggregate limits apply only to individuals.15 Aggregate limits prevent individuals from contributing “more than an aggregate of $46,200 to candidates
and their authorized committees or more than $70,800 to anyone else” during a two-year period. 16

8. Id. at 1448–62.
9. Id. at 1456–58.
10. See infra Part IV.A.
11. See infra Part IV.B.
12. McCutcheon v. FEC, 893 F. Supp. 2d 133, 135 (D.D.C. 2012), rev’d, 134 S. Ct. 1434
(2014).
13. Id. at 137.
14. Id. at 135 (emphasis added) (citing Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L.
No. 107-155, § 307, 116 Stat. 81, 102–03 (2002)).
15. Id. at 135, 136.
16. Id. at 136 (citing 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(3) (2012), declared unconstitutional by FEC v.
McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014) (current version at 52 U.S.C.A. § 30116(a) (West 2014))).
The two-year period begins on January 1 of an odd-numbered year and ends December 31 of the
following even-numbered year. See id. § 30116(a)(3). These limits are adjusted every oddnumbered year for inflation, thus the limit numbers that the Supreme Court evaluated in McCutcheon are higher than the values discussed by the district court. See id. § 30116(c).
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Mr. McCutcheon, a voter and resident of Alabama, had made various
contributions during the 2011–2012 election cycle,17 including contributions to the RNC, the National Republican Senatorial Committee, and the
Alabama Republican Party. 18 However, he wanted to give additional funds
to the committees, as well as to numerous candidates, but could not because
of FECA’s aggregate limits. 19 The RNC in turn argued that it should be
able to accept contributions that donors such as Mr. McCutcheon wanted to
give. 20 The plaintiffs filed a Motion for a Preliminary Injunction to enjoin
the FEC from enforcing the aggregate limits under the statute.21
The district court denied the preliminary injunction and granted the
FEC’s motion to dismiss, finding the aggregate limits constitutional. 22
First, the court distinguished between campaign contributions, the amount
an individual can give to a candidate, and campaign expenditures, the
amount an individual or group can personally spend on a political campaign
(including, for example, on advertisements to promote a certain candidate
or cause). 23 The court explained that contribution limits are evaluated under a lower level of scrutiny than expenditure limits “because they primarily
implicate the First Amendment rights of association, not expression, and
contributors remain able to vindicate their associational interests in other
ways.” 24 The court reasoned that aggregate limits function as contribution
limits, not expenditure limits, because they restrict a donor’s capacity to
give funds, rather than a campaign or political party’s ability to spend donated money. 25
The court then analyzed the aggregate limits under a lower level of
scrutiny. 26 In constitutional law, a lower level of scrutiny entails application of the closely drawn test: the regulation that impacts a constitutional
right must be “closely drawn to match a sufficiently important [government] interest.” 27 The district court noted that the government’s interest in

17. Under FECA, an election cycle is defined as “the period beginning on the day after the
date of the most recent election for the specific office or seat that a candidate is seeking and ending on the date of the next election for that office or seat,” and “a primary election and a general
election [are] considered to be separate elections.” Id. § 30101(25).
18. McCutcheon, 893 F. Supp. 2d at 136.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 137, 142. In response, the FEC filed a motion to dismiss. Id. at 142.
22. Id. at 142.
23. Id. at 137–38.
24. Id. at 138 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 22 (1976)) (emphasis added).
25. Id.
26. Id. at 137–38.
27. Id. at 137 (quoting McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 136 (2003), overruled by Citizens
United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Expenditure limits are
evaluated under the higher threshold of “strict scrutiny.” Id.
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preventing corruption is the only legitimate rationale for limiting First
Amendment rights and should be narrowly construed. 28
The court described corruption as quid pro quo, which it defined as
“dollars for political favors,” or more simply, bribery. 29 The court also noted, however, that the extent of the government’s interest in preventing corruption was ambiguous. 30 For example, the court understood Citizens United v. FEC 31 as allowing for an interpretation of corruption as something less
than “pure bribery.” 32 The court ultimately concluded that since the plaintiffs had not contested the base limits, these limits were presumably constitutional for the purpose of preventing corruption. 33 The court held that aggregate limits could thus be upheld as a means of protecting and preventing
“circumvention” of the base limits. 34 The plaintiffs appealed directly to the
Supreme Court. 35
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The Supreme Court’s interpretation of FECA before McCutcheon was
based on two primary premises: first, that the Court should apply different
levels of scrutiny to expenditure limits and contribution limits; and second,
that the Court should define the government’s interest in preventing corrup-

28. Id. at 138–39.
29. Id. at 139 (quoting FEC v. Nat’l Conservative Political Action Comm. (NCPAC), 470
U.S. 480, 497 (1985)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (finding “[i]nfluence over or access to
elected officials does not amount to corruption” and “contributing a large amount of money does
not ipso facto implicate the government’s anticorruption interest” (citing Citizens United v. FEC,
558 U.S. 310, 360 (2010))).
30. Id.
31. 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
32. McCutcheon, 893 F. Supp. 2d at 139 (citing Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 361).
33. Id. at 139–40.
34. Id. The district court explained:
Eliminating the aggregate limits means an individual might, for example, give half-amillion dollars in a single check to a joint fundraising committee comprising a party’s
presidential candidate, the party’s national party committee, and most of the party’s
state party committees. After the fundraiser, the committees are required to divvy the
contributions to ensure that no committees receives more than its permitted share . . .
but because party committees may transfer unlimited amounts of money to other party
committees of the same party, the half-a-million-dollar contribution might nevertheless
find its way to a single committee’s coffers.
Id. at 140 (citations omitted); see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 38 (1976) (finding that aggregate limits are “no more than a corollary” of base limits and protect constitutionally permissible base limits from being circumvented).
35. McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1444 (2014) (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (plurality
opinion). The Supreme Court “noted probable jurisdiction.” Id. A party can appeal directly to
the Supreme Court from an order granting or denying “an interlocutory or permanent injunction in
any civil action, suit or proceeding required by an Act of Congress to be heard and determined by
a district court of three judges.” 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (2012).
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tion broadly. 36 The Court’s 1976 decision in Buckley v. Valeo37 provided
the foundation for the understanding that expenditure limits and contribution limits implicate different First Amendment concerns.38 Buckley also
suggested that the government’s interest in preventing corruption could extend beyond the deterrence of blatant bribery, and also could include efforts
to thwart improper influence and the appearance of corruption.39 After
Congress amended FECA in 2002, the Court continued to apply different
levels of scrutiny based on limit type. 40 The Court also embraced the broad
definition of corruption, perhaps even expanding the scope of the government’s interest from Buckley. 41 Citizens United v. FEC marked a shift in
the Court’s interpretation of campaign finance regulation when the Court
determined that the government could only justify a limitation on free
speech in order to prevent quid pro quo corruption. 42
A. The Court Distinguished Between Contributions and Expenditures
and Defined Corruption Broadly In Buckley and Subsequent Cases
Supreme Court interpretation of FECA originated with the Buckley decision in 1976. Buckley considered numerous constitutional challenges to
FECA of 1971 and the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. 43 The 1971 Act, in
relevant part, limited individual campaign contributions to $1,000 per candidate with a cap of $25,000 on the total amount an individual could give
during each election.44 FECA also limited spending by “individuals and
groups ‘relative to a clearly identified candidate’” to $1,000 per year, and
imposed certain limits on expenditures by federal candidates and political
party conventions. 45
In Buckley, the Court determined that contribution limits and expenditure limits implicate different First Amendment concerns and thus warrant
distinct levels of scrutiny. 46 The Buckley Court also implied that the government’s interest in regulating campaign finance could be justified not only by efforts to prevent quid pro quo corruption, but also the appearance of
corruption and improper influence.47 The Court continued to apply the contribution-expenditure dichotomy and this broad definition of corruption,
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

See infra Parts II.A–B.
424 U.S. 1 (1976).
Id. at 20–21.
Id. at 27.
See infra Part II.B.
See infra Part II.B.
558 U.S. 310, 359–60 (2010); see also infra Part II.C.
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 6–7.
Id. at 7.
Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 608(e) (1970 ed., Supp. IV)).
Id. at 19–20.
Id. at 27.
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perhaps even expanding it, when faced with other challenges to FECA and
its subsequent versions after Buckley. 48
1. In Buckley, the Court Established the Contribution-Expenditure
Limit Dichotomy and Hinted at a Broad Definition of
Corruption
The Court in Buckley considered numerous First Amendment challenges to FECA provisions, including both expenditure and contribution
limits, brought by presidential and senatorial candidates and political party
groups. 49 The Court struck down campaign spending restrictions but upheld limits on campaign contributions, differentiating between the First
Amendment impacts on expenditures and contributions. 50
The Buckley Court found that FECA’s expenditure limits, including
limits of $1,000 by groups and individuals annually, posed a greater threat
to First Amendment rights because these spending restrictions directly impacted political expression. 51 The Court explained that a limit on spending
would restrict the candidate’s ability to reach the public through news and
advertisements by default. 52 The Court noted that “virtually every means of
communicating ideas in today’s mass society requires the expenditure of
money,” emphasizing that the public’s reliance on “television, radio, and
other mass media for news and information has made these expensive
modes of communication indispensable instruments of effective political
speech.” 53
Because the expenditure limits imposed major First Amendment burdens, the Court applied the “exacting scrutiny” test.54 Under this test, the
government can only limit free speech to further a “vital” 55 interest and the
restriction must bear a “substantial relation”56 to this interest. The Court
supported the government’s ostensible interest in stopping actual and apparent corruption, but nevertheless determined that the government had not
48. See infra Part II.A.2.
49. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 6–8.
50. Id. at 23, 143.
51. Id. at 19.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 44. This test is also referred to as the “strict scrutiny” test. See, e.g., McCutcheon
v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1445 (2014) (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (plurality opinion)
(“[R]egardless whether we apply strict scrutiny or Buckley’s ‘closely drawn’ test, we must assess
the fit between the stated governmental objective and the means selected to achieve that objective.”); McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 141 (2003) (finding that contribution limits were subject
to a lower level of scrutiny than strict scrutiny).
55. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 94 (quoting Am. Party of Tex. v. White, 415 U.S. 767, 780–781
(1974) (internal quotation marks omitted).
56. Id. at 64 (quoting Gibson v. Fla. Legislative Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 546 (1963)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).

2015]

McCutcheon v. FEC

29

demonstrated how expenditure restrictions would serve this interest.57 The
Court concluded that limits on campaign spending constituted a major burden on free speech because such limits would automatically impact how
much, how broadly, or how in-depth a candidate, political party, or individual could communicate through expensive mass media. 58
Conversely, with respect to the contribution limits of $1,000 per candidate (with an overall cap of $25,000), the Court determined that these
limits involved only a minor limitation on a donor’s speech. 59 Even if an
individual was limited in contributing to a candidate financially, the Court
reasoned that the individual could still engage freely in political discourse.60
The individual also could contribute in other ways, such as volunteering for
a candidate’s campaign. 61
Thus, the Court evaluated the First Amendment impacts of contribution limits under the closely drawn test,62 the lower level of scrutiny, and
determined these limits were justified on the basis of preventing actual and
apparent corruption. 63 The Court identified the corruption justification in
part as an interest in preventing quid pro quo corruption, but also hinted that
the government could have a legitimate interest in stopping other types of
corruption. 64 The Court noted that the appearance of corruption or “improper influence” is similarly problematic to quid pro quo. 65
Finally, the Court countered appellants’ arguments that FECA’s contribution limits were unnecessary because bribery laws were enough to
combat corruption. 66 The Court found that these laws merely addressed
57. Id. at 45. Instead, the Court reasoned that the government’s true interest behind expenditure limits was leveling the playing field among candidates running for office and curbing campaign spending and costs—both unacceptable government rationales for limiting First Amendment rights. Id. at 48–49, 54, 57.
58. Id. at 19. The Court also emphasized the “particular importance that candidates have the
unfettered opportunity to make their views known,” in order for voters to make informed decisions in elections. Id. at 52–53.
59. Id. at 20–21.
60. Id. at 21.
61. Id. at 22, 28. The Court also characterized contribution limits as less concerning than expenditure limits since they primarily implicate associational freedoms. Id. at 24–25. The Court
noted that contributions allow individuals to align themselves with a particular candidate and also
empower “like-minded persons to pool their resources in furtherance of common political goals.”
Id. at 22.
62. Under the closely drawn test, the government must establish a legitimate interest in limiting speech, and restrictions on speech must be “closely drawn” to this interest to “avoid unnecessary abridgment of associational freedoms.” Id. at 25.
63. Id. at 25–29.
64. Id. at 27.
65. Id. (“Congress could legitimately conclude that the avoidance of the appearance of improper influence ‘is also critical . . . if confidence in the system of representative [g]overnment is
not to be eroded to a disastrous extent.’” (quoting U.S. Civil Service Comm’n v. Nat’l Ass’n of
Letter Carriers, AFL-CIO, 413 U.S. 548, 565 (1973))).
66. Id. at 27–28.
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“the most blatant and specific attempts of those with money to influence
governmental action.” 67 This reasoning also seemed to indicate that the
government’s interest in limiting corruption could extend to a more nuanced definition of corruption. 68
The Court concluded that FECA’s expenditure limits violated the First
Amendment because of their direct restraints on political expression.69 By
contrast, the Court found that contribution limits were constitutional because they only minimally impinged on free speech and were enacted for
the legitimate purpose of preventing corruption. 70
2. After Buckley, the Court Continued to Apply the ExpenditureContribution Limit Dichotomy and Arguably Broadened the
Definition of Corruption
When faced with subsequent challenges to FECA and state campaign
spending laws, the Court consistently continued to evaluate contribution
limits and expenditure limits under different levels of scrutiny, and applied—and even broadened—Buckley’s definition of corruption. 71
The Court held expenditure and contribution limits to distinct levels of
scrutiny under the First Amendment in the wake of Buckley.72 In FEC v.
Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 73 the Court reiterated the concept that “restrictions on contributions require less compelling justification than restrictions on independent spending.” 74 Similarly, in Colorado Republican
Federal Campaign Committee v. FEC (“Colorado I”), 75 the Court recognized that typically contribution limits are constitutional, while expenditure
limits are not. 76 Justifications for this dichotomy echoed Buckley’s reasoning: “Restraints on expenditures generally curb more expressive and associational activity than limits on contributions do,” and thus expenditure limits

67. Id. at 28.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 58–59.
70. Id. at 58.
71. See, e.g., FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 155–56 (2003); FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed.
Campaign Comm. (Colorado II), 533 U.S. 431, 437, 440–41, 456 (2001); Nixon v. Shrink Mo.
Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 386–89 (2000); Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC (Colorado I), 518 U.S. 604, 610 (1996); FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. 238, 259–60 (1986);
NCPAC, 470 U.S. 480, 493–94, 497–98 (1985); Cal. Med. Ass’n. v. FEC, 453 U.S. 182, 194–95,
197–99 (1981).
72. See, e.g., NCPAC, 470 U.S. at 493–94.
73. 479 U.S. 238 (1986).
74. Id. at 259–60.
75. 518 U.S. 604 (1996).
76. Id. at 610. The “contribution limits” that the Court found to be constitutional were “limits that apply both when an individual or political committee contributes money directly to a candidate and also when they indirectly contribute by making expenditures that they coordinate with
the candidate.” Id. (citations omitted).
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are subject to a higher level of scrutiny. 77 Later, the Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government Political Action Committee (“PAC”) 78 Court continued
to draw this distinction and applied the closely drawn test for limits on contributions. 79
The Court also continued to define the government’s interest in campaign finance limits as an interest in preventing corruption, including, but
not limited to, quid pro quo. 80 Where Buckley had hinted at the possibility
of corruption beyond quid pro quo, including “improper influence,” 81 the
Court began to explicitly recognize a broad definition of corruption that included undue influence. 82 For example, though the Court in FEC v. National Conservative Political Action Committee 83 (“NCPAC”) found that the
“hallmark of corruption is the financial quid pro quo: dollars for political
favors,” the Court also defined corruption as situations where officials are
“influenced” to act in ways that will bring them the most money, often at
the cost of their official responsibilities.84 The Court began to emphasize
concerns that public officials could become “too compliant with the wishes
of large contributors” and the potential for donations to cloud politicians’
judgments and hamper responsiveness to constituents. 85
B. The Court Reinterpreted FECA’s Free Speech Implications After
Amendments to the Act in 2002
The Court considered the constitutionality of campaign finance limitations in a new era when FECA was amended in 2002. 86 Congress passed
the amendments to address concerns that individuals had found ways to

77. Colorado II, 533 U.S. at 440.
78. 528 U.S. 377 (2000).
79. Id. at 386–88.
80. See, e.g., FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 155–56 (2003); Colorado II, 533 U.S. at 456;
Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. at 388–89; FEC v. NCPAC, 470 U.S. 480, 497–98 (1985).
81. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 27 (1976).
82. See supra note 80.
83. 470 U.S. 480 (1985).
84. Id. at 497.
85. See, e.g., Colorado II, 533 U.S. at 440–41 (defining corruption not only as quid pro quo
arrangements “but also as undue influence on an officeholder’s judgment, and the appearance of
such influence” (citations omitted)); Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. at 389 (finding that corruption may include not only quid pro quo but also “the broader threat from politicians too compliant
with the wishes of large contributors”); see also Beaumont, 539 U.S. at 155–56 (noting that campaign contribution limits are justified “carrying as they do a plain threat to political integrity and a
plain warrant to counter the appearance and reality of corruption and the misuse of corporate advantages”). The Colorado II Court also recognized that circumvention could constitute corruption
if “unlimited coordinated spending by a party” allowed that party to work around constitutionally
legitimate contribution limits. Colorado II, 533 U.S. at 456; see also Beaumont, 539 U.S. at 155.
This is analogous to the circumvention justification that the district court noted in McCutcheon.
See McCutcheon v. FEC, 893 F. Supp. 2d. 133, 139–40 (D.D.C. 2012).
86. See infra Parts II.B.1–2.
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work around the original contribution limits upheld in Buckley. 87 The Court
evaluated the First Amendment impact of these statutory changes in
McConnell v. FEC, 88 maintaining the expenditure-contribution dichotomy
and the broad definition of corruption under the new FECA framework. 89
1. Congress Passed the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act to Amend
FECA
Congress amended FECA in 2002 with the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (“BCRA”). 90 BCRA was primarily aimed at limiting the use of
soft money—funds contributed to political parties and limited to nonfederal
purposes, including “influencing state or local elections.” 91
Congress passed the amendments following the publication of a 1998
Senate Report entitled Investigation of Illegal or Improper Activities in
Connection with the 1996 Federal Election Campaigns. 92 At the time, individuals and corporations could use essentially unlimited amounts of soft
money on state elections, party support, and general initiatives such as “get
out the vote.” 93 The Report revealed that individuals and corporations were
able to work around FECA contribution limits by “funnel[ing] soft money
through state parties, congressional campaign committees, and leadership
[PACs], where its use for federal election activity becomes difficult to
trace.” 94 Individuals also were giving, and candidates and national parties
were encouraging, hefty donations in exchange for special treatment and
access to public officials.95 The Report indicated that the amount of soft
money raised by parties had increased dramatically, from $89 million in
1992 to $262 million by 1996. 96
The Report concluded that this vast amount of soft money had undermined efforts to stop corruption. 97 The Report recommended action to

87. See infra Part II.B.1.
88. 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
89. Id. at 136–37.
90. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (2002). BCRA
is also known as the McCain-Feingold Act.
91. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 122–23. For additional background reading on BCRA and soft
money issues, see Scott E. Thomas, The ‘Soft Money’ and ‘Issue Ad’ Mess: How We Got Here,
How Congress Responded, and What the FEC Is Doing, FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION
(2003), www.fec.gov/members/former_members/thomas/thomasarticle06.pdf (discussing the issues leading to BCRA, the Act itself, and FEC efforts to implement and enforce BRCRA).
92. S. Rep. No.105-167, pts. I–VI (1998).
93. S. Rep. No. 105-167, pt. V, at 7516 (1998).
94. Id. at 7517–18.
95. Id. at 7517, 7519.
96. Id. at 7517.
97. Id. at 7519.
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close this “loophole” and crack down on soft money spending. 98 Congress
then passed BCRA in 2002. 99
2. The Court Maintained the Contribution-Expenditure Dichotomy
and Broad Definition of Corruption in McConnell
In McConnell v. FEC, the Court considered the constitutionality of the
BCRA amendments in a multi-part opinion. 100 Justices Stevens and
O’Connor, joined by a majority of the Court, wrote the first part of the
opinion, which evaluated limitations on the use of soft money. 101 The justices reiterated that the proper test for evaluating contribution limits under
the First Amendment was the “less rigorous” closely drawn test.102 The
majority then determined that BCRA’s restrictions on soft money were constitutional methods of preventing circumvention of the contribution limits. 103 Justices Stevens and O’Connor emphasized the importance of deferring to Congress and its knowledge on the most effective measures for
preventing “circumvention of regulations [such as contribution limits] designed to protect the integrity of the political process.” 104
The McConnell Court also applied a broad definition of corruption in
its analysis of the amendments. 105 The justices found it “firmly established
that Congress’ legitimate interest extends beyond preventing simple cashfor-votes corruption” and that this interest also includes thwarting improper
influence on public officials and its appearance. 106 The majority noted that
this more subtle form of corruption, causing public officials to act based on
the priorities of their largest donors, could be as problematic as quid pro
quo corruption, especially because of the difficulties in proving when it occurs. 107 Justices Stevens and O’Connor explicitly rejected Justice Kennedy’s “crabbed view” that corruption should be limited to quid pro quo, noting that this definition “ignores precedent, common sense, and the realities
of political fundraising.” 108 Finding that the ability of donors to gain access
to elected officials through soft money donations fit within a properly broad

98. Id. at 7519, 7526.
99. See Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (2002).
100. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 114 (2003).
101. Id. at 114, 122.
102. Id. at 137, 141.
103. Id. at 146, 165–66.
104. Id. at 137; see also FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 155 (2003) (“[D]eference to legislative choice is warranted particularly when Congress regulates campaign contributions, carrying as
they do a plain threat to political integrity and a plain warrant to counter the appearance and reality of corruption and the misuse of corporate advantages.”).
105. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 136, 142–56.
106. Id. at 136, 150 (citing Colorado II, 533 U.S. 431, 441 (2001)).
107. Id. at 153.
108. Id. at 152.
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definition of corruption, the majority upheld BCRA’s soft money contribution limits. 109
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Kennedy all
dissented from the Stevens-O’Connor opinion, arguing that the soft money
limits were an unacceptable attack on free speech. 110 In particular, the dissenters believed that the majority’s definition of corruption went too far. 111
Justice Scalia argued that an organization’s increased access via financial
backing to a public official it supports is simply par for the course in politics. 112 He noted that donor organizations flock to officials that already
support their causes (seemingly dismissing arguments that the scenario may
be the other way around). 113 Justice Thomas argued that bribery laws are
sufficient to thwart both quid pro quo and other less obvious forms of corruption, while Justice Kennedy explicitly rejected the government’s power
to stop any corruption other than quid pro quo.114 Finally, Justices Thomas
and Kennedy both argued that the proper standard of review for any type of
campaign finance regulation is always strict scrutiny, rather than the closely
drawn test. 115
C. The Court Narrowed Its Definition of Corruption in Citizens United
In Citizens United v. FEC, five members of the Court seemed to break
with precedent in a narrowed definition of corruption.116 The case came before the Supreme Court when a non-profit corporation challenged BCRA
provisions limiting spending on advertisement broadcasting within a certain
timeframe before an election. 117
The Citizens United Court limited the scope of the government’s interest in preventing corruption as a justification for First Amendment restrictions. 118 The majority understood Buckley as only allowing campaign

109. Id. at 152, 224.
110. See id. at 259 (Scalia, J., dissenting), 266–67 (Thomas, J., dissenting), 291–98 (Kennedy,
J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
111. See id. at 259 (Scalia, J., dissenting), 291–98 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part, dissenting
in part).
112. Id. at 259 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
113. Id.
114. Id. at 267 (Thomas, J., dissenting), 291–98 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part).
115. Id. at 266 (Thomas, J., dissenting), 308–14 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part).
116. 558 U.S. 310, 359 (2010). Justice Kennedy authored the Citizens United majority opinion and was joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito. The Justices
were aligned essentially identically to their positions in McConnell, with the additions of Justices
Alito and Roberts to the majority in Citizens United, and Justice Sotomayor replacing Justice
Souter in the minority, though this time the McConnell dissenters had the majority.
117. Id. at 319–21.
118. Id. at 359–60.
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finance limits in the interest of deterring quid pro quo corruption. 119 The
Court reasoned that just because individuals “may have influence or access
to elected officials does not mean that these officials are corrupt.” 120 The
majority warned that including undue influence in the definition of corruption essentially gives the government unchecked power to restrict First
Amendment rights. 121 In stark contrast to the reasoning of the McConnell
majority, the Court concluded that “[i]ngratiation and access . . . are not
corruption.” 122
The Court ultimately upheld the soft money restrictions of McConnell
and struck down BCRA limits that impacted when and how corporations
could broadcast advertisements related to federal elections. 123 The majority
famously held that the government cannot restrict political speech on the
basis of the “speaker’s corporate identity.” 124
III. THE COURT’S REASONING
In McCutcheon v. FEC, the Supreme Court reversed the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia and held that aggregate contribution limits were unconstitutional under the First Amendment. 125 Led by
Chief Justice Roberts, the plurality concluded that “aggregate limits do little, if anything, to address [corruption], while seriously restricting participation in the democratic process.” 126 The Court came to this conclusion by
determining that the holding in Buckley did not apply and finding that the
aggregate limits were not sufficiently tied to the government’s interest—an
interest the Court narrowly defined as only preventing quid pro quo corruption. 127
First, the Court determined that the Buckley holding—that aggregate
limits were a constitutional means for preventing circumvention of base
limits—did not apply. 128 The plurality noted that multiple “statutory safe119. Id. at 359 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (citing McConnell, 540
U.S. at 296–98).
120. Id.
121. Id. The Court noted that the “appearance of influence or access, furthermore, will not
cause the electorate to lose faith in our democracy.” Id. at 360. The Court reasoned that spending
by corporations or other actors in order to “persuade voters” actually underscores that “the people
have the ultimate influence over elected officials” and undermines arguments that political funding could threaten the democratic system. Id.
122. Id. at 360.
123. Id. at 361, 365–66.
124. Id. at 347, 365.
125. 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1442, 1462 (2014) (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (plurality opinion).
126. Id. at 1442.
127. Id. at 1445–46, 1449–52.
128. Id. at 1446 (“Although Buckley provides some guidance, we think that its ultimate conclusion about the constitutionality of the aggregate limit in place under FECA does not control
here.”).
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guards against circumvention” had become part of the statutory scheme
since the Buckley decision, such as additional base contribution limits and
stricter earmarking provisions. 129 The plurality concluded that Buckley did
not control, stating, “[w]e are confronted with a different statute and different legal arguments, at a different point in the development of campaign finance regulation.” 130
Next, the Court weighed the First Amendment interests implicated by
aggregate limits. 131 The plurality explained that the First Amendment
“safeguards an individual’s right to participate in the public debate through
political expression and political association.”132 The Court reasoned that
by imposing a definitive ceiling on the amount an individual can contribute
to candidates and committees, aggregate limits essentially force an individual to ration her political participation, thereby limiting the expression and
promotion of her policy concerns. 133
The Court then emphasized that the government can only regulate
campaign finance for the purpose of addressing quid pro quo corruption or
the appearance of this type of corruption.134 Quid pro quo corruption occurs when a donor aims to directly influence a candidate by making donations with specific political strings attached.135 For example, a donor might
offer money in exchange for the recipient’s sponsorship of a bill. The plurality noted several activities that do not constitute quid pro quo corruption,
including “the possibility that an individual who spends large sums may
garner ‘influence over or access to’ elected officials or political parties.” 136
While acknowledging the difficulty in differentiating between quid pro quo
129. Id. at 1446–47; see 11 C.F.R. § 110.6(b)(1) (2014) (“[E]armarked means a designation,
instruction, or encumbrance, whether direct or indirect, express or implied, oral or written, which
results in all or any part of a contribution or expenditure being made to, or expended on behalf of,
a clearly identified candidate or a candidate’s authorized committee.”).
130. McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1447 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (plurality opinion).
131. Id. at 1447–50.
132. Id. at 1448.
133. Id. at 1448–49. The Court rejected arguments that an individual’s participation is minimally threatened by aggregate limits because an individual could simply give smaller contributions to a greater number of candidates, or contribute in ways outside of the financial realm, such
as volunteering for a campaign. Id. at 1449. The Court noted that forcing an individual to give
less “because he wants to support more candidates or causes is to impose a special burden on
broader participation in the democratic process.” Id. Furthermore, the plurality argued that “personal volunteering is not a realistic alternative for those who wish to support a wide variety of
candidates or causes.” Id.
134. Id. at 1450–51 (“No matter how desirable it may seem, it is not an acceptable governmental objective to ‘level the playing field,’ or to ‘level electoral opportunities,’ or to ‘equaliz[e]
the financial resources of candidates.’” (quoting Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v.
Bennett, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 2825–26 (2011); Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 741–42 (2008); Buckley
v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 56 (1976))).
135. See, e.g., id. at 1441, 1451–52 (defining quid pro quo as “a direct exchange of an official
act for money”).
136. Id. at 1451 (quoting Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 359 (2010)).
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corruption and “general influence,” the Court stressed the importance of
“err[ing] on the side of protecting political speech rather than suppressing
it.” 137 In other words, the plurality seemed to find instances of questionable
sway over elected officials a small price to pay for the robust protection of
First Amendment rights. 138
The Court also reiterated that even if the government limits free speech
for the (legitimate) aim of preventing quid pro quo corruption, it still has
the “burden of proving the constitutionality of its actions.” 139 This burden
can be satisfied when the government can show that the limits on free
speech are appropriately designed (either narrowly tailored or closely
drawn, depending on the level of scrutiny) to prevent quid pro quo corruption. 140 The plurality did not elaborate on the appropriate level of scrutiny
to apply to aggregate limits because it found that even if the lower level of
scrutiny applied, the aggregate limits were not “closely drawn” to preventing quid pro quo corruption. 141
The government contended that by restricting the total amount of
money that an individual can donate during an election cycle, aggregate
limits prevent circumvention of base limits, that is, the limit on how much
an individual can give to each candidate. 142 For example, the government
argued that without aggregate limits, an individual could give the maximum
amount allowed by base limits to a particular candidate, and then attempt to
give more by contributing additional funds to PACs apt to support that
same candidate. 143 The plurality disagreed and instead found that the possibility of this base limit circumvention was “far too speculative” under the
current statutory framework and dismissed various examples of circumvention as highly unlikely. 144 The Court reasoned that given the implausibility
of the various circumvention scenarios, the potential alternatives to aggregate limits that would not infringe on First Amendment rights, and the
blanket ban on every contribution over the aggregate limit threshold, the
aggregate limits violated the First Amendment. 145

137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 1452 (quoting United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 816
(2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
140. Id. at 1456–57.
141. Id. at 1446 (“Because we find a substantial mismatch between the Government’s stated
objective and the means selected to achieve it, the aggregate limits fail even under the ‘closely
drawn’ test. We therefore need not parse the differences between the two standards[, strict scrutiny and closely drawn,] in this case.”).
142. Id. at 1452–53.
143. Id. at 1453.
144. Id. at 1452–56.
145. Id. at 1458–59.
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Concurring, Justice Thomas agreed with the plurality that aggregate
limits were a violation of First Amendment rights. 146 He argued, however,
that Buckley should be overruled in its entirety. 147 Justice Thomas rejected
Buckley’s distinction between campaign expenditures and campaign contributions (with campaign contributions subject to a lower level of scrutiny
under the closely drawn test), and contended that both should be subject to
the same heightened level of (strict) scrutiny in evaluating possible First
Amendment infringements. 148 Justice Thomas argued that contrary to the
reasoning in Buckley, campaign contributions directly impact free speech by
“amplifying the voice of the candidate and help[ing] to ensure the dissemination of the messages that the contributor wishes to convey.” 149 Justice
Thomas agreed with the plurality that aggregate limits “would surely fail”
under First Amendment strict scrutiny. 150
Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan,
dissented. 151 The dissent took issue with three primary premises advanced
by the plurality: 1) that the government only has an interest in preventing
quid pro quo corruption; 2) that aggregate limits are unnecessary for preventing the circumvention of base limits; and 3) that aggregate limits are
not closely drawn to the government’s interest in protecting base limits.152
First, Justice Breyer argued that the plurality’s definition of corruption
was too narrow, breaking with the foundational purposes for the First
Amendment and the definition of corruption from precedent. 153 The dissent
highlighted the historical importance of the First Amendment as a tool to
foster a “chain of communication between the people, and those, to whom
they have committed the exercise of the powers of government.” 154 Noting
the clear risk that unchecked contributions could threaten the responsiveness of elected officials to their constituents, the dissent contended that cor-

146. Id. at 1464 (Thomas, J., concurring) (agreeing with the plurality that “limiting the amount
of money a person may give to a candidate does impose a direct restraint on his political communication”).
147. Id. at 1462.
148. Id. at 1462–64. Justice Thomas contended, “[c]ontributions and expenditures are simply
‘two sides of the same First Amendment coin.’” Id. at 1464 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S.
1, 241, 244 (1976) (Burger, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
149. Id. at 1463 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t, 528 U.S. 377,
415 (2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
150. Id.
151. Id. at 1465.
152. Id. at 1465–66.
153. Id. at 1466–70 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
154. Id. at 1467 (quoting JAMES WILSON & THOMAS MCKEAN, COMMENTARIES ON THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 30–31 (1792)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
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ruption should be afforded a broader, more nuanced definition than blatant
bribery. 155
The dissent offered the following definition of corruption: any contributions that may have an “undue influence on an officeholder’s judgment,”
that lead to “privileged access” to these officials, and the appearance of
these types of corruption.156 Justice Breyer supported this definition with
an extensive documentation of prior decisions in which the Court had defined corruption to include improper influence over elected officials by
wealthy donors, even if this influence did not rise to the level of quid pro
quo deals. 157
Justice Breyer also rejected the plurality’s arguments that aggregate
limits are unnecessary for protecting base limits.158 Primarily, he argued
that these limits are essential to prevent circumvention and offered three
situations where donors are able to work around base limits in the absence
of aggregate limits. 159 In addition, the dissent countered the plurality’s
claim that changing laws had made aggregate limits unnecessary. 160 For
example, even though Congress had imposed additional restraints on contributions to PACs, the dissent argued that “[f]ederal law places no upper
limit on the number of PACs supporting a party or a group of party candidates that can be established.” 161 Thus political party supporters could
simply create additional PACs and new recipients for contributions. 162
Finally, Justice Breyer argued that aggregate limits are narrowly tailored to the government’s interest in preventing circumvention of base limits. 163 Justice Breyer contended that though the plurality offered alternatives to aggregate limits to achieve this purpose, it did not “show, or try to
show, that these hypothetical alternatives could effectively replace aggregate contribution limits.” 164 Furthermore, the dissent noted that the “hypo155. Id. at 1468–69 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 27–28 (1976)).
156. Id. at 1469–70 (quoting FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 155–56 (2003)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 146–52 (2003); Nixon v. Shrink Mo.
Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 390 (2000)).
157. Id. at 1468–70; see, e.g., FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 155–56 (2003) (defining corruption as “not only . . . quid pro quo agreements, but also as undue influence on an officeholder’s
judgment”); McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 153 (2003) (“Just as troubling to a functioning democracy as classic quid pro quo corruption is the danger that officeholders will decide issues not
on the merits or the desires of their constituencies, but according to the wishes of those who have
made large financial contributions valued by the officeholder.”).
158. McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1471–79 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
159. Id. at 1472–75. See infra Part IV.B.1 for an in-depth discussion of one of these scenarios
in which donors are able to work around base limits in the absence of aggregate limits.
160. McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1475 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
161. Id.
162. Id. The dissent contended, “creating a [new] PAC is primarily a matter of paperwork, a
knowledgeable staff person, and a little time.” Id.
163. Id. at 1479.
164. Id.

40

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW ENDNOTES

[VOL. 74:23

thetical presence” of these alternatives when Buckley was decided did not
impact the Court’s holding in that case that aggregate limits were constitutional. 165
IV. ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court should have upheld FECA’s aggregate limits in
McCutcheon. First, the Court defined the government’s interest in preventing corruption too narrowly, breaking with precedent in this definition and
failing to defer to Congress’s understanding of corruption. 166 Second,
without aggregate limits, individuals can and have been able to work
around other valid FECA regulations, including base limits. 167 Ultimately
the Court’s decision threatens to dismantle campaign finance regulations
entirely. 168 Without aggregate limits, base limits are meaningless and individuals will be able to contribute as much money as they want, as long as
the number of local party committees and PACs continues to grow. 169
A. The McCutcheon Court Incorrectly Narrowed the Definition of
Corruption.
In McCutcheon, the plurality struck down aggregate limits based in
part on its holding that the government’s interest in deterring corruption is
strictly limited to the prevention of quid pro quo corruption and its appearance. 170 This definition of corruption was too narrow and broke with precedent. 171 The Court should have deferred to Congress’s definition of corruption, which would include forms of corruption beyond quid pro quo.172
1. The Plurality’s Definition of Corruption Was Too Narrow and
Inconsistent with Precedent
The plurality’s exceedingly narrow definition went against precedent. 173 In prior cases, the Court consistently defined corruption as extending beyond quid pro quo and including the interest in preventing improper
influence. 174 Only one case, Citizens United, limited the definition of corruption to quid pro quo, the definition used by the McCutcheon plurality. 175
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

Id.
See infra Part IV.A.
See infra Part IV.B.
See infra Part IV.B.2.
See infra Part IV.B.2.
McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1450–51, 1462 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (plurality opinion).
See infra Part IV.A.1.
See infra Part IV.A.2.
See infra note 177; see also McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1468–70 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
See infra note 177; see also McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1468–70 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 359–60 (2010).
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That definition was dictum in Citizens United and limits corruption to actions that would already be punishable under criminal bribery laws.176
The Court’s precedent establishes that corruption extends beyond quid
pro quo. 177 For example, the Buckley Court alluded to the fact that the government may have a legitimate interest in preventing “improper influence.” 178 The Court also recognized that bribery laws outside of FECA
were only equipped to address the “most blatant and specific attempts of
those with money to influence governmental action,” seemingly emphasizing FECA’s role in addressing less obvious forms of corruption. 179 In the
wake of Buckley, the Court explained the government’s interest in addressing broad forms of corruption even more explicitly, including recognizing
the government’s valid efforts to thwart “undue influence on an officeholder’s judgment” and acts of “politicians . . . too compliant with the wishes of
large contributors.”180 The McConnell Court emphasized that undue influence, making officials more beholden to wealthy contributors than their
constituents, was “[j]ust as troubling” as quid pro quo corruption. 181
Citizens United is the only case that lends support to the plurality’s
narrow reading of corruption. 182 However, the Citizens United majority’s
176. McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1471 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also Zephyr Teachout, The
Anti-Corruption Principle, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 341, 391 (2009).
177. See, e.g., FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 155–56 (2003) (defining corruption as both
quid pro quo and undue influence); McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 153 (2003) (“Just as troubling to a functioning democracy as classic quid pro quo corruption is the danger that officeholders will decide issues not on the merits or the desires of their constituencies, but according to the
wishes of those who have made large financial contributions valued by the officeholder.”); Colorado II, 533 U.S. 431, 441 (2001) (noting that corruption is “understood not only as quid pro quo
agreements, but also as undue influence on an officeholder’s judgment, and the appearance of
such influence”); Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 389–90 (2000) (defining corruption as including not only quid pro quo, but also “‘improper influence[,]’ . . . ‘opportunities for
abuse,’ . . . and officials too compliant with the wishes of large contributors” (quoting Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 27 (1976))); FEC v. NCPAC, 470 U.S. 480, 497–98 (1985) (finding that
though the “hallmark of corruption is the financial quid pro quo,” it is also situations where officials are “influenced” to act in ways that will bring them the most money, often at the cost of their
official responsibilities); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 27 (finding that “improper influence” could be of
equal concern to Congress as quid pro quo corruption); see also McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1466–
70 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Teachout, supra note 176, at 391 (“For twenty-two years, the Court
clearly explained (in majority opinions) that quid pro quo was but one type of corruption.”).
178. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 27.
179. Id.
180. Colorado II, 533 U.S. at 440–41; Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. at 389.
181. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 153.
182. McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1470–71 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Citizens United v.
FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 359 (2010)). Zephyr Teachout argues that the FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life
decision marked the turning point where the Court determined that quid pro quo was “the heart of
corruption.” Teachout, supra note 176, at 391 (citing FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S.
449, 478 (2007)). However, the Wisconsin Right to Life Court did not explicitly rule out other
understandings of corruption as the Citizens United majority did. Compare Wis. Right to Life, 551
U.S. 449, 478–79 (2007) (finding that an interest in preventing quid pro quo corruption was not a
legitimate justification for regulating issue advertisements), with Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310 at
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discussion of corruption can be treated as dictum because it was unnecessary for the holding that struck down free speech limits on corporations. 183
Citizens United also did not explicitly overrule the broad definition of corruption that the McConnell Court used to uphold soft money limits. 184 Additionally, the McCutcheon plurality left the soft money limits from
McConnell intact, while dismantling the very definition of corruption (extending beyond quid pro quo) on which McConnell’s soft money holding
depended. 185 This fact reiterates that the McCutcheon plurality mistakenly
narrowed the scope of the government’s anti-corruption interest.
Furthermore, the plurality’s quid pro quo definition would limit corruption to activities that are already actionable under criminal bribery
laws. 186 Professor Zephyr Teachout notes that this definition is attractive in
its simplicity: essentially the Court need only look to criminal bribery laws
to determine whether or not there has been corruption. 187 However, this
limited definition not only cuts against precedent, but also undermines the
importance of preventing other, broader types of corruption, of which the
Framers’ were acutely aware in their drafting of the Constitution. 188 Debates about the size of the Senate and the House of Representatives, how
members of Congress would be elected, the checks and balances system,
the impeachment of the President, and many other major aspects of the
Constitution were based on the Framers’ concerns that corruption could
threaten the “integrity” of the democratic system. 189
2. Congress, Not the Court, Should Define Corruption
The McCutcheon plurality broke with precedent in its definition of
corruption, but perhaps the Court should not have offered a definition at

359 (“When Buckley identified a sufficiently important governmental interest in preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption, that interest was limited to quid pro quo corruption.”).
183. McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1471 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Citizens United, 558 U.S.
at 365).
184. Id. (citing Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 359, 360–61 (“This case . . . is about independent
expenditures, not soft money.”)).
185. Id. (“Our holding about the constitutionality of the aggregate limits clearly does not overrule McConnell ‘s holding about ‘soft money.’” (quoting id. at 1451 n.6)).
186. See Teachout, supra note 176, at 388–91. Justice Breyer also seems to hint at this idea in
the McCutcheon dissent. See, e.g., McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1466 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[The
plurality] defines quid pro quo corruption to mean no more than ‘a direct exchange of an official
act for money’—an act akin to bribery.”).
187. Teachout, supra note 176, at 391.
188. See id. at 347–73. Teachout argues that a “loss of integrity” theory of corruption is the
one that would have influenced the Framers the most. Id. at 395. This is the perception of “corruption as a loss of political integrity, and systems that predictably create moral failings for members of Congress.” Id.
189. Id. at 347–73.
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all. 190 Arguably, the Court should have deferred to Congress’s definition of
corruption because Congress “defin[es] the legislator’s role in our democracy.” 191 The Court’s own precedent recognizes the need for this deference. 192 If the Court had deferred to Congress, it is clear that Congress itself understood the interest in preventing corruption to include types of
corruption beyond quid pro quo. 193
Professor Deborah Hellman argues that in campaign finance jurisprudence, “the Court has . . . missed the significance of the fact that defining
legislative corruption entangles the Court in defining the legislator’s role in
our democracy.” 194 Professor Hellman’s analysis is particularly relevant in
the wake of McCutcheon because she argues that the Court should stay out
of determining the boundaries of corruption all together. She contends that
defining corruption necessarily implicates a verdict on what constitutes
good and bad governance by legislators, a decision for Congress and not the
Courts. 195 Justice Breyer also articulates this concern in his McCutcheon
dissent. 196
Professor Hellman notes that an understanding of corruption is based
on a parallel theory for how a democracy, and its public officials, should
operate. 197 For example, if the theory is that voters have trusted the legislator to employ her best judgment in making decisions, then corruption would
be anything that undermines this judgment. 198 If the understanding is that
the legislator should answer directly to her constituents, corruption exists
when “a legislator weighs the preferences of some too heavily,” particularly
the predilections of rich donors.199 Quid pro quo corruption is implicated in
the final theory, that a legislator is acting pursuant to his obligations as long
as she is not making decisions based on an exchange of money or other

190. Deborah Hellman, Defining Corruption and Constitutionalizing Democracy, 111 MICH.
L. REV. 1385 (2013).
191. Id. at 1387; see also Adam Lamparello, Citizens Disunited: McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission, 90 IND. L.J. SUPP. 43, 43 (2014).
192. See, e.g., FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 155 (2003); McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93,
137 (2003).
193. See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 105-167, pt. V, at 7516–20 (1998).
194. Hellman, supra note 190, at 1387.
195. Id. at 1394–96.
196. McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1481 (2014) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[This] decision . . . substitutes judges’ understandings of how the political process works for the understanding of Congress.”).
197. Hellman, supra note 190, at 1394–96.
198. Id. at 1397–98. Professor Hellman argues that this is the perception of corruption in
McConnell. Id.; see McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 150 (2003) (“Our cases have firmly established that Congress’ legitimate interest extends beyond preventing simple cash-for-votes corruption to curbing ‘undue influence on an officeholder’s judgment, and the appearance of such influence.’” (quoting Colorado II, 533 U.S. 431, 441(2001))).
199. Hellman, supra note 190, at 1399 (citing McConnell, 540 U.S. at 153).
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benefits for her votes. 200 Professor Hellman argues that in this final scenario, a public official “need merely avoid bribery or its very close cousins in
order to avoid corruption.” 201
The Supreme Court should recognize that it is overstepping its authority when it attempts to define corruption. In doing so, it “implicitly adopts
one particular, contested conception of a legislator’s role in a wellfunctioning democracy” over others. 202 Though the Court has not apparently recognized the link between defining corruption and defining good governance, it has more generally addressed the importance of deferring to
Congress in evaluating contribution limits. 203 In McConnell, the Court noted the importance of evaluating contribution limits under a lower level of
scrutiny, deferring to Congress’s “ability to weigh competing constitutional
interests in an area in which it enjoys particular expertise.” 204 Similarly, the
Court in Beaumont found that “deference to legislative choice is warranted
particularly when Congress regulates campaign contributions, carrying as
they do a plain threat to political integrity.” 205 The McCutcheon dissent also argued that Congress, rather than the judiciary, was “far better suited” to
define corruption and the solutions for preventing it. 206
The McCutcheon Court, rather than being concerned with overstepping its own authority, believed that Congress had gone too far.207 The plurality warned against deference to Congress, arguing that when Congress
regulates campaign finance for purposes other than combatting quid pro
quo corruption, it is essentially determining who should be in political power. 208 The plurality contended that elected representatives should be the
“last people to help decide who should govern.” 209 Legal scholars have
called this argument the “incumbent self-protection” rationale.210 Under
this theory, justices have rationalized striking down campaign finance regulations, arguing that they are a guise for incumbents to ensure their own
reelection. 211
200. Id. at 1400–01.
201. Id. at 1401.
202. Id. at 1402.
203. See, e.g., FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 155 (2003); McConnell, 540 U.S. at 137
(2003).
204. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 137. The Court also held that deference gives Congress “sufficient room to anticipate and respond to concerns about circumvention of regulations designed to
protect the integrity of the political process.” Id.
205. Beaumont, 539 U.S at 155.
206. McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1480 (2014) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
207. Id. at 1441–42 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (plurality opinion).
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. See, e.g., Andrew Tutt, McCutcheon Calls for a National Referendum on Campaign Finance (Literally), 114 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 84, 85 (2014).
211. Id. at 88–89.
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This concern arguably has merit. 212 However, allowing the justices to
step in to counter incumbent self-protection problems raises line-drawing
issues, and questions of how the Court would determine “[h]ow much entrenchment is too much” and when an official’s efforts to regain office are
reasonable versus illicit.213 These questions bear significant resemblance to
political gerrymandering issues, which the Court has determined are nonjusticiable. 214 It is true that deferring to Congress’s definition of corruption
in campaign finance regulation could lead to entrenchment of incumbents.
It is also apparent that the task of defining corruption in this context can be
daunting and has plagued the Court and legal scholars alike. 215 However,
this difficult policy-making is the type of challenge that Congress, not the
Court, was designed to address.
Had the Court deferred to Congress’s definition, it is clear that the
congressional definition encompasses corruption beyond quid pro quo, at
least during the years prior to, and when, Congress passed BCRA. 216 In
pushing for amendments to FECA to stop the flow of soft money in campaign finance, a Senate Report recognized that the “appearance of corruption, in which large contributions appear to be traded for access to government officials or favored treatment, and the resulting loss of public
confidence in government,” were the most concerning impacts of soft money. 217 The Report cited numerous examples of large contributions leading
to privileged access to the Executive Branch, as well as private events and
212. See, e.g., id. at 89. Professor Hellman also acknowledges the incumbent entrenchment
concern. Hellman, supra note 190, at 1411. She notes, “[p]erhaps we need judicial supervision to
ensure that the theory of democracy . . . [and corruption] is not intended to or does not succeed in
overly entrenching incumbents.” Id. Hellman argues, however, that “this justification for judicial
oversight nevertheless suggests only a limited role for the courts.” Id.
213. Hellman, supra note 190, at 1411–12. Justice Breyer poses similar questions in his dissent. McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1480 (Breyer, J., dissenting). He noted:
Determining whether anticorruption objectives justify a particular set of contribution
limits requires answering empirically based questions, and applying significant discretion and judgment. To what extent will unrestricted giving lead to corruption or its appearance? What forms will any such corruption take? To what extent will a lack of
regulation undermine public confidence in the democratic system? To what extent can
regulation restore it? These kinds of questions, while not easily answered, are questions that Congress is far better suited to resolve than are judges.
Id.
214. Hellman, supra note 190, at 1412–13 (citing Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 281
(2004)). Hellman notes that the Court in Vieth found that there are “no judicially discernible and
manageable standards for adjudicating political gerrymandering claims.” Id.
215. See, e.g., Lamparello, supra note 191, at 43; Matt Titolo, The Jargon of Corruption, 43
SW. L. REV. 591 (2014); Teachout, supra note 176, at 342; Thomas F. Burke, The Concept of
Corruption in Campaign Finance Law, 14 CONST. COMMENT. 127 (1997).
216. See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 105-167, pt. V, at 7516–20 (1998).
217. Id. at 7520. These concerns stand in stark contrast to the majority’s claims in Citizens
United that the “appearance of influence or access . . . will not cause the electorate to lose faith in
our democracy.” 558 U.S. 310, 360 (2010). The Citizens United Court concluded that,
“[i]ngratiation and access, in any event, are not corruption.” Id.
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photo opportunities with other prominent officials.218 The Report also endorsed the Buckley Court’s definition of corruption as including “improper
influence.” 219 Evidently the Senate’s concerns extended beyond blatant
quid pro quo, and the McCutcheon plurality would have come to a broader
definition of corruption had it deferred to Congress’s understanding at the
time of the BCRA amendments.
Ultimately, the McCutcheon plurality erred in finding that the government’s interest in preventing corruption only extends to preventing quid pro
quo corruption. The plurality broke with precedent in adopting this narrow
definition. 220 The Court arguably should not have defined corruption in the
first place, and instead should have deferred to Congress’s definition of corruption, which encompassed more than simply quid pro quo arrangements. 221
B. The Court’s Decision Will—and Already Has—Led to
Circumvention of Other FECA Limits
The McCutcheon Court should not have rejected aggregate limits as a
means for preventing the circumvention of base limits. The plurality argued that the risk of circumvention was “far too speculative” and that new
campaign finance laws and existing bribery laws had essentially eliminated
the possibility of base limit circumvention. 222 In making this conclusion,
the plurality failed to give enough weight to the dissent’s examples that aggregate limits do in fact prevent circumvention and also corruption, including quid pro quo. 223 Second, in the wake of McCutcheon, it is clear that
donors can and will work around other FECA limits, regardless of other
FEC regulations in place.224
1.

The Dissent’s Examples of Circumvention Establish That
Aggregate Limits Are Necessary for Preventing Corruption

The dissent offered numerous examples of how individuals could
thwart other campaign finance regulations in the absence of aggregate limits. 225 The dissent noted that without aggregate limits, contributors could
“find ways to channel millions of dollars to parties and to individual candidates, producing precisely the kind of ‘corruption’ or ‘appearance of cor218. S. Rep. No. 105-167, pt. V, at 7519 (1998).
219. Id. (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 27 (1976)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
220. See supra Part IV.A.1.
221. See supra Part IV.A.2.
222. McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1453–56 (2014) (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (plurality
opinion).
223. See infra Part IV.B.1.
224. See infra Part IV.B.2.
225. McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. at 1472–75 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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ruption’ that previously led the Court to hold aggregate limits constitutional.” 226 In one example, based on warnings by the FEC, the dissent explained how an individual would be able to contribute approximately sixteen times the amount of funding to a given party than she could have othotherwise if aggregate limits were in place.227
In this example, the dissent first explained the base limits 228 and aggregate limits.229 The dissent noted that without aggregate limits, an individual could legally give either one of the major parties in the U.S. approximately $1.2 million in a two-year election cycle.230 Each political party
has 50 committees, thus the donor could donate $10,000 each year to 50 political party committees, amounting to $1 million in a two-year election cycle. 231 In addition, the individual could donate $194,400 total to national
party committees (base limits of $64,800 per election cycle to a national
party committee, multiplied by three national party committees for each national party). 232 Each party then could create a “Joint Party Committee,” 233
made up of the national and state party committees, which would facilitate
the process for contributors to make large donations to multiple party committees. 234 Under this system, the individual would be able to write one
check to the joint committee, which could then divide up the funds as necessary so that the individual would be in compliance with the base limits.235
By contrast to the total $1.2 million a donor could give under this scenario,

226. Id. at 1472.
227. Id. at 1472–73.
228. Base limits:
$5,200 per election cycle ($2,600 per year) per candidate.
$64,800 per election cycle ($32,400 per year) to a national party committee (and each
national party has three national party committees).
$10,000 per year to state and local party committees.
$5,000 per year to PACs.
See McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1472, 1485 Appendix B, Table 1 (citing 2 U.S.C. §441a(a)(1)
(2012), reclassified as 52 U.S.C.A. § 30116 (West 2014)).
229. Aggregate limits:
Total limit: $123,200 per election cycle.
$48,600 to federal candidates.
$74,600 to political committees.
Only $48,600 of which can go to state and local party committees and PACs.
Only $20,000 of which can go to state party committees (each political party has 50
state party committees).
See McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1472, 1485 Appendix B, Table 1; 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1).
230. McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1472.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Also referred to as “Joint Fundraising Committees.” See generally Robert K. Kelner, The
Practical Consequences of McCutcheon, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 380, 380–81 (2014).
234. McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1472.
235. Id.
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with aggregate limits in place, the donor could only have contributed
$74,600 (the aggregate limit on contributions to political committees).236
During the 2012 election cycle, a similar scenario occurred in reality. 237 Candidate Mitt Romney’s joint fundraising committee Romney Victory was able to generate funds for “Republican Party committees in four
non-competitive states . . . which were then able to make unlimited transfers
to state GOP committees in 10 swing states.” 238 This strategy enabled contributors to work around the base limits on party committee contributions. 239 The contributor would give the maximum amount to the joint
committee, which would then distribute these funds to four state party
committees in non-battleground states. 240 In turn, the state party committees, which are allowed to make “unlimited transfers among themselves,”
could pass these funds on to a single state committee in a swing state. 241
Thus the individual’s complete contribution “would end up boosting the
Romney campaign in a key battleground.” 242 The Huffington Post reports
that a minimum of 174 contributors gave the joint committee the maximum
committee contribution, which was then funneled to Republican Party
committees in battleground states. 243 Though this situation occurred even
in the absence of aggregate limits, aggregate limits are an additional safeguard to make this type of circumvention less likely and more difficult to
achieve.
The McCutcheon Court was incorrect to conclude that these scenarios
do not raise corruption concerns. These situations will almost certainly lead
party officials to “solicit . . . large contributions from wealthy donors” for
joint party committees.244 Garnering these contributions allows officials to
direct funds to the states where they are most needed and also accept larger
donations, by distributing the donation so that it complies with base limits. 245 Then the party official may “feel[] obliged to provide [the wealthy
donor] special access and influence, and perhaps even a quid pro quo legis-

236. Id.
237. Paul Blumenthal, Justice Alito’s “Wild Hypotheticals” Claim in McCutcheon v. FEC
POST
(Oct.
8,
2013),
Misses
the
Mark,
HUFF.
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/10/08/mccutcheon-v-fec-alito_n_4065441.html.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1472 (2014) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
245. See, e.g., Blumenthal, supra note 237.
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lative favor.” 246 This is exactly the type of corruption the Court was concerned about when it upheld BCRA’s soft money limits in McConnell. 247
2. In the Real World, Circumvention Is Already Occurring in the
Absence of Aggregate Limits
The McCutcheon plurality also noted the “improbability of circumvention,” especially in light of regulations already in place.248 In support of
this argument, the plurality in particular relied on an FEC regulation that
prohibits individuals who have given to a candidate from “also contribut[ing] to a political committee that has supported or anticipates supporting the same candidate in the same election” if the contributor knows
that some of the funds he gives to the committee will also go to the candidate. 249 The actual impacts of the McCutcheon decision already call the
plurality’s skepticism of circumvention into question and the plurality’s reliance on the FEC regulations are misplaced.
First, circumvention is already occurring. Both parties have established joint fundraising committees envisioned by the dissent’s example.250
Joint fundraising committees have increased dramatically in number in recent years. 251 In 2012, 372 new joint fundraising committees were formed,
compared to only 42 in 1994. 252 In 2013, there were 415 “new or continuing” joint fundraising committees and approximately 20 have been added
since April 2014 when the Court decided McCutcheon. 253 Though “[t]here
has not been a flood of donations” to these new committees as of yet, “for
individuals who can afford to give to dozens of campaigns, the new freedom offers yet another level of influence.” 254 Furthermore, these committees in general have raised exponentially more funds for presidential campaigns over time, “nearly doubling from $449 million in 2008 to $953
million in 2012.” 255
By the summer of 2014, just a few months after the McCutcheon decision in April, over 300 contributors had given $11.6 million in excess of
246. Id.
247. Id. at 1472–73; see McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 182 (2003) (“Large soft-money donations at a candidate’s or officeholder’s behest give rise to all of the same corruption concerns
posed by contributions made directly to the candidate or officeholder.”).
248. McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1456 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (plurality opinion).
249. Id. at 1477 (citing 11 CFR § 110.1(h) (2014)).
250. Matea Gold, Wealthy Political Donors Seize on New Latitude to Give to Unlimited Candidates, WASH. POST (Sept. 2, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/wealthy-politicaldonors-seize-on-new-latitude-to-give-to-unlimited-candidates/2014/09/01/d94aeefa-2f8c-11e4bb9b-997ae96fad33_story.html.
251. Kelner, supra note 233, at 382.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 382, 383.
254. Gold, supra note 250.
255. Kelner, supra note 233, at 382.
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what they would have been allowed to donate before the decision.256 In total, contributions had reached $50.2 million as of July 2014, not including
funds given to super PACs. 257 Of this total amount, $16 million, or about
32%, of the funds had “gone directly to candidates.” 258
Donors taking advantage of the eradication of aggregate limits have
explicitly pointed to some of the types of corruption that the Court included
in its definition prior to Citizens United. As one donor told the Washington
Post, “You have to realize, when you start contributing to all these guys,
they give you access to meet them and talk about your issues . . . . They
know I’m a big supporter.” 259 Another characterized the McCutcheon decision as allowing him to give the maximum amount of donations to a larger
group of “good friends.” 260 One donor had contributed to “25 Senate candidates and 16 House candidates.” 261
Second, the McCutcheon plurality’s reliance on other FEC regulations
to prevent circumvention and corruption are misplaced. 262 The plurality in
particular highlighted the effectiveness of an FEC regulation that prevents
donors from giving to both a candidate, and a political committee that the
donor knows will support (or has supported) the same candidate. 263 As the
dissent noted, “nine FEC cases decided since the year 2000 . . . refer to this
regulation.” 264 In every single case except for one, “the FEC failed to find
the requisite ‘knowledge’” on behalf of the donor who contributed to both a
candidate and a political committee supporting that same candidate.265 In
fact, the FEC has become somewhat notorious for lack of enforcement or
investigation of potential base limit circumvention. 266 The FEC is composed of six members, four of which are needed to initiate an investigation. 267 Ann Ravel, one of the commissioners, argues that the three Republicans on the Commission have blocked all investigations recently and

256. Gold, supra note 250.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. For more reading on the view that FEC rules are enough to prevent circumvention on
their own, see Allen Dickerson, McCutcheon v. FEC and the Supreme Court’s Return to Buckley,
CATO SUP. CT. REV. 95, 122–25 (2014).
263. McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1477 (2014) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing 11
CFR § 110.1(h)(2) (2014)).
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. See, e.g., Daniel I. Weiner, McCutcheon’s Anti-Circumvention Folly, BRENNAN CTR.
FOR JUSTICE (Apr. 9, 2014), http://www.brennancenter.org/blog/mccutcheon-anti-circumventionfolly; Ann Ravel, Op-Ed, How Not to Enforce Campaign Laws, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 2, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/03/opinion/how-not-to-enforce-campaign-laws.html?_r=1.
267. Ravel, supra note 266.
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warns that the “judiciary’s misguided deference [to the FEC]—in effect, a
rubber-stamp approval of inaction—encourages the commissioners not to
cooperate with one another.” 268
The Court’s own precedent warns against relying too heavily on anticircumvention measures already in place. For example, in Colorado II, the
Court found that an earmarking provision in the U.S. Code, similar to the
FEC regulation discussed above, “would reach only the most clumsy attempts to pass contributions through to candidates.” 269 The Court concluded that considering the earmarking rule as the extent of the government’s
ability to prevent circumvention would undermine its attempts to stop more
subtle methods “through which parties could effectively pass excessive contributions on to candidates.” 270
These real world examples coming just weeks and months in the wake
of McCutcheon raise serious questions about the future of campaign finance
regulations. Without aggregate limits, base limits arguably are becoming
meaningless. Now the only true limit on how much an individual can spend
comes down to the number of state and local party committees and PACs
affiliated with each party. As long as there are different committees for the
individual to donate to, there is nothing to stop her from pouring in contributions. In the meantime, it will be critically important to protect the only
true remaining limits on campaign spending—the base limits—by strengthening regulations of joint committee spending and reforming the FEC so
that it can become a true campaign finance watchdog. 271
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court should have upheld FECA’s aggregate limits in
McCutcheon. First, the Court mischaracterized the government’s interest in
preventing corruption, defining corruption too narrowly, breaking with
precedent in this definition, and failing to defer to Congress’s understanding
268. Id. Ravel notes that the consequence of this deference is that “voters will again be barraged with political advertising from unknown sources, making it difficult for them to make informed decisions. If we continue on this path, we will be betraying the public and putting our
democracy in jeopardy.” Id.; see also S. Rep. No. 105-167, pt. V, at 6290 (1998) (“A fundamental
premise of [FECA] is that voters are entitled to know who is funding candidates’ campaigns. . . .
The ability of wealthy contributors to finance million-dollar advertising blitzes without disclosing
their identity to voters fundamentally undermines the spirit and letter of current campaign finance
laws.”).
269. 533 U.S. 431, 462 (2001) (citing 2 U.S.C. §441a(a)(8) (2012)) (current version at 52
U.S.C. § 30116(a)(8) (West 2014)) (“For the purposes of . . . this section, all contributions made
by a person, either directly or indirectly, on behalf of a particular candidate, including contributions which are in any way earmarked or otherwise directed through an intermediary or conduit to
such candidate, shall be treated as contributions from such person to such candidate.”); see also
Weiner, supra note 266.
270. Weiner, supra note 266; see also Colorado II, 533 U.S. at 462.
271. See, e.g., Weiner, supra note 266.
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of corruption when the Act was amended. 272 Second, without aggregate
limits, individuals can and have been able to work around FECA’s valid
base limits. 273 Donors have been able to engage in precisely the types of
behavior that the Court was concerned with in its pre-Citizens United definition of corruption.274 Perhaps even more concerning is that fact that as
long as the numbers of candidates, state and local party committees, and
PACs continue to grow, the base limits will become an empty formality
without an overall ceiling on individual contributions.275 This reality leaves
open the question of whether McCutcheon has essentially eradicated meaningful campaign finance regulation altogether.
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